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LINGUISTICS AND PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Kristen Osenga •
Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things. 1

It begins with a collection of words-a single sentence that can be worth
thousands, or even millions, of dollars, or may instead be worth little more
than the paper on which it is written; a sentence that can secure one
company's financial future or spell another company's ruin? It all begins
with the patent claim, a single sentence given the extraordinary function of

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to
thank Katharine Baker, Timothy Holbrook, and Joseph Scott Miller for their comments on
early drafts of this paper. I also appreciate the helpful suggestions on even earlier drafts of this
paper by participants at the Fifth Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Cardozo
School of Law and a faculty workshop at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Finally, I thank
Steven Jinks (Chicago-Kent, '07) for his research assistance in preparing the CAFC Lexicon
described herein. Any errors are mine. Comments are appreciated at kosenga@richmond.edu.
I. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
2. Consider, at one end of the spectrum, Yahoo!'s takeover of Overture in 2003. In a
deal valued at $1.63 billion, Yahoo! acquired Overture for no apparent reason other than
Overture's U.S. Patent No. 6,269,361 which covers advertisement placement technology used
by various companies, including Yahoo! competitor, Google. Armed with this patent, Yahoo!
then acquired 2.7 million shares of Google stock at its initial public offering in exchange for
Google's continued use of advertisement placement covered by the '361 patent. See Saul
Hansell, Google and Yahoo Settle Dispute over Search Patent, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2004, at
C6; Usman Latif, Google's Bid-for-placement Patent Settlement Cover-up, TEcHUSER.NET,
May 31, 2005, http://www.techuser.net/gcoverup.html. On the other end of the spectrum,
simply being on the defending end of patent infringement litigation, regardless of the party's
strength on the merits, may be enough to drive small companies out of business. See, e.g.,
Patent Law Revision: Testimony Before the Comm. on S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property (2005), available at 2005 WLNR 9424393 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President
and Chief Patent Counsel, Time Warner, Inc.) (asserting that some companies may go out of
business simply attempting to defend against a patent infringement suit, let alone after losing
on the merits).
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designating the metes and bounds of an invention, providing notice to the
public to advance technology, and providing notice to competitors to avoid
trespass. 3 The value of the sentence, whether financial or functional, often
turns on the definition or construction given to the terms that comprise it.
And yet, claim construction-the process of giving the claim meaning
through defining its terms-is largely an unsettled and uncertain area of
patent law. 4 In part, this uncertainty may be due to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's failure to provide adequate guidance on the process.
This Article suggests that the Federal Circuit should clarify its claim
construction jurisprudence and look to the science of linguistics to provide
bases for an improved set of guidelines that will improve financial and
functional certainty in patent law.
In particular, this Article argues that claim construction should instead
track the way in which we, as readers of a language, 5 attempt to understand
what is being conveyed via the written word. First, there is a base level of
conventional understanding from which all interpretation starts, an
understanding that either a priori exists based on our earlier encounters with
the word or is obtained from a dictionary in cases in which we lack previous
knowledge. Second, from this conventional understanding, we construct the
actual meaning of the term based on a number of linguistic clues. These
clues are both internal and external to the language we are interpreting.
Internal linguistic clues include syntactic hints divined from the grammar
and sentence structure of the language to be interpreted. External linguistic
clues include situational pragmatics, or the use of non-linguistic factors, such
as the underlying knowledge of the interpreter that aids understanding.
Part I of this Article provides a background of the patent claim. Part II
discusses the history of the Federal Circuit's claim construction
jurisprudence, from Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme
Court opinion turning the reins of claim construction over to judges, to
Phillips v. A WH Corp., the en bane Federal Circuit case that was intended to
clarify the process of claim construction, but failed to do so. This section also
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The [patent] specification shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.").
4. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 29, 34 (2005) ("Although claim interpretation is fundamental to patent law,
both the theory and doctrine of the practice remain astonishingly underdeveloped ....").
5. Because claim construction relates to patent claims, which are parts of a written
document, persons attempting to understand claims will be referred to as readers. Linguistics,
however, often discusses the interpreter as a listener or hearer of the language to be
interpreted.
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describes and analyzes a number of claim construction canons, the auxiliary
guidelines for performing the claim construction process. Finally, Part ill
looks briefly at linguistics in general and then proposes the use of linguistic
techniques as a preferred methodology for claim construction. This section
also considers the conjunction of the proposed linguistic-based
methodologies with existing claim construction canons to develop a
complete claim construction process.
I. INTRODUCTION TO PATENT CLAIMS

To coin a phrase, "the name of the game is the claim. "6
An application for a United States patent includes a specification and one
or more drawings. 7 The specification consists of a written description of the
invention and the claims. 8 The written description is written in prose,
sentences and paragraphs, and includes a background of the invention as well
as detailed information on how to make, use, and/or perform the invention. 9
At the end of the written description are one or more claims, each a single
sentence that describes an invention entirely of its own. 10 While the written
description provides a more fulsome disclosure, the legal metes and bounds
of the invention are defined by the claims. 11

6. Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 497,499 (1990).
7. See 35 U.S.C. § lll(a)(2) (2000). Although not relevant to this discussion, the
application must also include an oath or declaration. See id.
8. See id. § 112. The term "specification" is often used interchangeably, although
inaccurately, to refer to just the written description.
9. See id.; see also Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining
that "[t]he 'written description' requirement implements the principle that a patent must
describe the technology . . . sought to be patented . . . [and] serves both to satisfy the
inventor's obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based,
and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed").
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 112. Technically, claims may be independent, meaning the claim
does describe an invention entirely of its own, or dependent, meaning that it builds off a prior
independent claim. See id. However, "a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a
claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed.
A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of
the claim to which it refers." /d. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, each claim
stands independently.
11. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339
( 1961) (''The claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant ...."), aff'd in pan,
rev'd in pan, 377 U.S. 476 (1964); Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d
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Because it is the claims that serve to define the outer extent of a
patentee's exclusionary right, they therefore must serve the dual functions of
putting boundaries on the patentee's monopoly 12 and providing sufficient
notice of that monopoly to allow the public to avoid infringing the patent. 13
The uncertainty over the proper procedure for claim construction has led to
uncertainty in patent scope/ 4 which in tum negates the notice and boundarystaking functions to be performed by the patent claim. In fact, it was with the
hope of achieving consistency and certainty in claim scope that district court
judges were charged with the task of claim construction:
[I]t is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain
to a reasonable degree the scope of the patentee's right to exclude . . . .
[C]ompetitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement litigation
1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he claim ... sets the metes and bounds of the invention
entitled to the protection ofthe patent system.").
12. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("[C]laims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry,
therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim." (citations omitted));
Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on
the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention.").
13. As the Federal Circuit explained:
[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art should be able to read a patent, to discern which
matter is disclosed and discussed in the written description, and to recognize which
matter has been claimed.... The ability to discern both what has been disclosed and
what has been claimed is the essence of public notice. It tells the public which
products or processes would infringe the patent and which would not.
PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(same), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2887 (2006); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d
1472, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) ("Public notice of the scope of the right
to exclude, as provided by the patent claims, specification and prosecution history, is a critical
function of the entire scheme of patent law. The notice function is critical because it provides
competitors with the necessary information upon which they can rely to shape their behavior
in the marketplace.").
14. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 49,99 (2005).
The discretion left to the courts when approaching claim construction creates an
uncertainty itself. Because no statute describes exactly how courts should interpret
claims, observers must look to the courts for guidance on interpretation issues.
Without clear direction from the courts in the form of a single methodology, one
cannot predict a claim's meaning because of the uncertainty about which
methodology will be used.
/d.
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occurs, that a judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the
patent and its associated public record and apply the established rules of
construction, and in that way arrive at the true and consistent scope of the
patent owner's rights to be given legal effect. 15

In reality, however, this consistency and certainty is not being achieved.
Although claim construction is a matter of law, 16 studies have shown that a
district court judge's claim construction is reversed by the Federal Circuit in
approximately one-third of all patent cases. 17 How is it that district court
judges, most of whom are skilled at similar tasks of contract interpretation
and statutory construction, are getting claim construction so wrong?
Part of the problem may be the structure of claims themselves. The
patent claim is a single sentence that utilizes words to recite a textual
description of what the patentee considers his invention. Parsing that idea,
two immediate problems come to mind. First, there is the difficulty of
explaining anything complex in a single, concise, and comprehensible
sentence; in fact, it is difficult to explain something as simple as a peanutbutter-and-jelly sandwich given this constraint. 18 Although people unfamiliar

15. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Mar/arum I), 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (in bane) (emphasis added), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
16. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (in
bane).
17. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (analyzing 179 cases
wherein the Federal Circuit provided an express review of claim construction and finding a
reversal rate of 29.6%); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. I, II (2001) (finding that district courts erred in 28% of
claim construction cases prior to 2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is
Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (finding a
34.5% claim construction reversal for cases appealed from 1996, after Markman I, to 2003);
Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need
for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 711, 746 (2003)
(finding a reversal rate of 41.5% in patent cases from 2001).
18. For example, consider the following claim for what is essentially a peanut butterand-jelly sandwich with crimped edges:
I. A sealed crustless sandwich, comprising:
a first bread layer having a first perimeter surface coplanar to a contact surface;
at least one filling of an edible food juxtaposed to said contact surface;
a second bread layer juxtaposed to said at least one filling opposite of said first bread
layer, wherein said second bread layer includes a second perimeter surface similar to
said first perimeter surface;
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with patent drafting are often troubled by this concept, patent claims have
been written as a single sentence since the time claims became part of the
patent application, 19 and claim construction would not likely be any less
problematic if multi-sentence claims were permissible. 20 Rather than arguing
for a change in patent drafting rules, this Article asserts that the single
sentence framework, among other things, requires a modification on
traditional syntactic analysis because word order and parts of speech are
often juxtaposed from common English usage to fit the framework. 21
Second, there is the inherent inadequacy of language to describe that
which is new, as inventions are required to be.Z2 As a predecessor court to the
Federal Circuit noted:
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of
drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the
23
invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it.

a crimped edge directly between said first perimeter surface and said second
perimeter surface for sealing said at least one filling between said first bread layer
and said second bread layer;
wherein a crust portion of said first bread layer and said second bread layer has been
removed.
Sealed Crustless Sandwich, U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 col.4 11.15-31 (filed Dec. 8, 1997); see
also Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at SA (describing
the '596 patent as covering a one-piece, crustless peanut butter-and-jelly sandwich).
19. See Fressola v. Manbeck, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1211, 1215 (D.D.C. 1995) (upholding the
Patent Office's requirement that patent claims be drafted as single sentences).
20. At least one Federal Circuit judge disagrees with this premise. See S. Jay Plager,
Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and
Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 72 (2001) ("Because claims in U.S. patents are
written using words and phrases that purport to be in the English language, it might help if the
rest of English language practice was used: short declarative sentences, careful and precise
phrasing, and so on.").
21. See infra Part ill.
22. In order to satisfy the novelty requirement, the invention must not have been
described in another reference prior to invention by the patentee, nor can the invention have
been described, publicly used, or offered for sale more than one year prior to invention by the
patentee. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2000).
23. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967); cf Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002) (''The doctrine of
equivalents is premised on language's inability to capture the essence of innovation .... ").
Some judges, however, would place the blame not on the difficulties of crafting claims for
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One way this problem manifests itself is that patent claims often include
words used in a slightly unexpected manner, such as when a word is used as
a part of speech that is unusual for that term or when atypical word pairings
are used to craft unusual phrases. One example of this is the use of nouns and
verbs as adjectives, such as in "perimeter surface" from the peanut butterand-jelly sandwich patent described above. 24
Beyond the language difficulties of attempting to describe an invention
completely and precisely in a single sentence and using existing words to
describe a new invention, the process involved in drafting claims raises yet
another problem. The patent applicant, in drafting claims, is trying to walk a
thin line of fashioning a claim sufficiently narrow that it is not invalid over
the prior art, but at the same time trying to obtain a sufficiently wide scope of
protection that may include coverage of future devices. 25 In navigating this
line, the patentee often results to hedge-type words, such as "about" and
"substantially" that obscure definitions, 26 or to quasi-clear phrases that allow
for some wiggle room, such as "normally connectible." 27
In addition, the very types of cases that make it to the Federal Circuit on
claim construction issues might explain part of the high rate of reversal. In
particular, only a certain type of case involving claim construction is likely to
be appealed, or even make it to trial at all. 28 The cases most likely to be
new inventions, but rather the inartfullanguage abilities of lawyers. See ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac
Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nichols, J., dissenting) ("We are up
against what we must realistically consider a growing inability of speakers and writers,
lawyers, technicians, and laymen, to say what they intend to say with accuracy and clarity.").
24. See supra note 18.
25. See Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("The jurisprudence of claim construction reflects the difficult balance between a
patentee's exhortation that courts should read the claims broadly and unlimited to the specific
embodiments shown in the specification, and the rule that claims should be construed
sufficiently narrowly to preserve their validity.").
26. See, e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("We note that like the term 'about,' the term 'substantially' is a descriptive term commonly
used in patent claims to 'avoid a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter."'
(quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
27. See, e.g., PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1362-63
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("normally connectible"); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elecs., Inc., 847 F.2d
819, 821-22 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing the use of similarly quasi-clear phrases, such as
"approach each other," "close to," "substantially equal," and "closely approximate").
28. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1984) (noting that academic analysis of data from appellate cases is
skewed by the fact that only a "peculiar sample of cases" actually are tried and appealed).
Klein and Priest then create a model to "clarif[y] the relationship between the set of disputes
settled and the set litigated." /d. at 4.
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appealed are those cases where both parties agree they have a strong
probability of success,29 or particular to patent litigation cases, where each
party's claim construction arguments are strong. If each party has a
reasonable, albeit divergent, claim construction stance, it is more likely that
the case will be appealed, as well as more likely that the district court and
Federal Circuit may reach different conclusions.
While the type of cases that are appealed and the many problems of
claim drafting surely account for some portion of the difficulty in construing
patent claims in a concise and certain manner, a far larger portion is likely
attributable to the Federal Circuit's failure to provide adequate guidance.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION JURISPRUDENCE

Construing a term of art after receipt of evidence is a mongrel practice. 30
A. The Importance of Claim Construction

The effort of the courts to understand a patent's claims-to define and
determine the outer extents of the patentee's rights via the process of claim
construction-is arguably the most important step in any patent litigation? 1
In fact, patent litigation is often not focused on whether the accused
infringing device includes a particular element, but rather on whether the
language of the patent claim covers the element as it exists in the accused
device? 2 In these cases, the claim construction becomes the deciding factor. 33
29. See id. at 16 (tying the likelihood of settlement to the parties' beliefs about probable
outcome).
30. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (in bane)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1119 (2004) ("[I]t is
clear that claim construction plays a major-and perhaps the major-role in patent
infringement litigation.").
32. See, e.g., Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("Where the parties do not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused product, ... but
disagree over possible claim interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into
claim construction and is amenable to summary judgment."); see also Int'l Rectifier Corp. v.
IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same).
33. See, e.g., ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 540 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he
question of literal infringement was resolved upon the court's construction of the claims.");
Markman/, 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in bane) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Deciding
the meaning of the words used in the patent is often dispositive of the question of
infringement."), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d

2006]

LINGUISTICS AND PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

69

There is some evidence that many patent infringement cases settle following
claim construction, and those that do not are often decided on summary
judgment. 34 Even where ~uestions of fact exist, the first step in any patent
case is claim construction. 5
While there is no argument that claim construction is an important
process, there is, however, extensive disagreement about how it should be
done. In part, any claim construction process is questionable because the
court is necessarily generating "meta-claims," or defining the words of a
claim using additional words, which themselves are equally suspect to
interpretation battles?6 In larger part, the Federal Circuit has not only largely
failed to provide adequate instruction on the issue, but it has even added to
that confusion by promoting, at various times, alternative methods of claim

1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he dispositive issue on the merits would be the definition of
the invention .... ").
Moreover, to speed infringement litigation along, it is not unheard of for parties to
stipulate the outcome of infringement or invalidity issues based on claim construction rulings.
See, e.g., Housey Pharrns., Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (noting that the patentee had stipulated that if the district court's claim "construction
were not reversed or modified on appeal, its patents would be invalid and not infringed").
34. Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.
REv. 101, 102 & n.4 (2005); see also Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:
Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889,911 (2001). But see Arti K.
Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1059 (2003) (evidencing that only twenty-nine percent of patent
infringement cases settle based on a trial court's claim construction); 1999 ABA Section of
Intellectual Property Law, 1999 Markman Survey, 18 A.B.A. SEC. PuB. INTELL. PROP. L. 3, 13
(2000) (same).
35. Claim construction is the first step in infringement analysis, Markman I, 52 F.3d at
976, as well as invalidity analysis, Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d
1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). At a more basic level, claim construction is also performed by
the Patent Office in determining whether a patent should even be granted. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE§ 21 06(1I)(C) (8th ed. 2001)
(latest rev. 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html
("[Patent Office] personnel must first determine the scope of a claim by thoroughly analyzing
the language of the claim before determining if the claim complies with each statutory
requirement for patentability." (emphasis omitted)). It should be noted, however, that unlike
litigation, claim construction at the Patent Office seeks the broadest reasonable interpretation
of claim language. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zietz, 893
F.2d 319,321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
36. Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 51-52; see also Lemley, supra note 34, at 101 n.2
(doubting "whether layering new words on top of old necessarily adds to the clarity of [patent]
claims").
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construction.37 The ensuing chaos and confusion over the process of claim
38
construction has created an area of law rife with controversy.
Claim construction, in many respects, is not unlike the processes of
statutory and contract interpretation that are well-worn provinces of the
district court judge. 39 In its in bane decision in Markman, the Federal Circuit
wrestled with the appropriate parallel for claim construction, analogizing the
process to both statutory and contract interpretation. 40 Just as contract law
requires that the respective parties agree to do something (or give up
something) that they are not obligated to do in exchange for the other party's
doing the same, the patentee agrees to make full disclosure of his invention, a
task that he is not otherwise obligated to do, in return for receiving an
exclusionary property right in the invention from the government. 41 Similar
to statutes, patents "are written instruments that all persons are presumed to
be aware of and are bound to follow .'.42 Both statutes and patents are
enforceable against the public, and the history of each, legislative in the case
of statutes and prosecution in the case of patents, are matters of public record
that can aid interpretation. 43 Given that the average district court judge has

37. See infra Part II.C.
38. This controversy has not only provided endless billable hours for patent litigators,
see Chu, supra note 17, at 1078, but also excellent fodder for scholarly commentary. For just a
few of the many possible examples, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus ProcessBased Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005); Joseph Scott
Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REv. 177 (2005); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
1 (2000) [hereinafter Nard, Claim Interpretation]; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 31.
39. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 49 ("Interpretation of texts is of course not
unique to claim construction."). Interestingly, Burk and Lemley go on to note that very little
of the vast body of literature devoted to interpretive techniques has been applied to the
practice of claim construction. /d.
40. See Markman I, 52 F.3d at 985-87. The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that
claim construction is more akin to statutory interpretation, see id. at 987, but that particular
outcome is not relevant to this discussion.
41. See id. at 985; see also id. at 997 (Mayer, J., concurring) (noting that "patents are
legal documents like contracts or deeds"). Unlike contract law, patents are not executory-the
Patent Office has no discretion in keeping its part of the bargain so long as the statutory
requirements of patentability are met. /d. at 985 n.14 (majority opinion). Moreover, in many
contracts, there may be a choice of parties with which to contract, but the patentee cannot, to
obtain a patent, contract with anyone other than the government. /d.
42. /d. at 987.
43. See id. There are, of course, differences between patents and statutes, such as that
patents are "prepared ex parte by interested parties, drafted in the lower reaches of an
executive department, and issued ministerially by a political officer," and thus "have none of
the indicia of a real statute." /d. at 998 n.8 (Mayer, J., concurring).
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significant experience in one or both of these areas of interpretation, claim
construction should be a familiar task. So why are these claim construction
determinations so often reversed? In any case, the one nuance that separates
claim construction from these other interpretive processes is the presence of
the fictional "person having ordinary skill in the art" or PHOSIT A. 44
However, the high rate of reversals certainly cannot be attributable to the
addition of the PHOSIT A. 45
Rather, the frequent reversals of district court claim constructions and
resultant uncertainty in claim scope and public notice should likely be
attributed to the lack of guidance on the topic by the Federal Circuit.46 For
example, until recently, the Federal Circuit was advancing two competing
"methodologies" of claim construction that potentially result in disparate
outcomes. For the purposes of this discussion, these methodologies will be
identified as "specification-dependent" and "dictionary-dependent."47 During
this period of competing claim construction processes, each methodology
garnered a significant number of proponents among judges of the Federal
Circuit.48 As such, the district court judge has been left with inconsistent

44. See Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 993 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("It
is the person of ordinary skill in the field of invention through whose eyes the claims are
construed.").
45. The PHOSITA cannot be blamed for the extraordinarily large number of reversals
because district court judges are skilled in working with other legal fictional characters, such
as the reasonable person. In fact, the Federal Circuit has drawn the analogy between the
"reasonable man" of tort law and the PHOSITA. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810
F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Moreover, at this point, the PHOSITA has been erroneously
excised from claim construction methodology. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
46. Because the Supreme Court has historically been reluctant to take patent cases,
especially on topics as pedestrian as claim construction, the Federal Circuit truly has been the
guiding force for claim construction methodology. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age
of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 387, 387 ("[T]he Federal Circuit ... has
become the de facto supreme court of patents."). The Supreme Court's recent renewed interest
in patent cases may alter this dynamic.
47. These competing methodologies will be described in more detail below. Other
commentators have cloaked these methodologies in slightly different terminology. See, e.g.,
Cotropia, supra note 14, at 59 ("specification methodology" vs. "heavy presumption
methodology"); Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 38, at 4 ("hypertextualism" vs.
"pragmatic textualism"); Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman
and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 355,358 n.13 [hereinafter Nard, Process Considerations]
(same); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 31, at 1111 ("holistic" vs. "procedural").
Nonetheless, the gist of the analysis remains similar.
48. See, e.g., Nard, Process Considerations, supra note 47, at 367-71 (describing Judges
Rader, Newman, and Mayer as pragmatic textualists); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 31,
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instructions for interpreting patent claim terms and, depending on which
methodology he or she chooses, may construe a claim term using a different
means than those favored by the appellate panel that ends up reviewing the
opinion, resulting in the high rate of reversal. 49 This problem was so apparent
that Professors Wagner and Petherbridge posited that claim construction
outcomes could be predicted based on factors such as Federal Circuit panel
composition. 50 Despite the Federal Circuit's subsequent effort to clarify its
claim construction jurisprudence,51 the methodology still remains unclear

at 1155 (describing Judges Bryson and Lourie as holistic interpreters and Judges Linn and
Dykas proceduralists).
49. The Federal Circuit's performance is often viewed by other judges as "largely
negative," Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 31, at 1109 n.12, perhaps, in part, due to the
Federal Circuit's willingness to reverse a significant portion of their claim construction
determinations, see Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) ('This court often hears criticism from district court judges
that its reversal rate on claim construction issues far exceeds that of other circuit courts.").
50. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 31, at 1163 (finding "that the individual
membership and overall composition of a three-judge panel that decides an appeal has a
statistically significant effect on the methodological approach used to analyze claim
construction," and in short, that there is "ample evidence of panel dependency in claim
construction at the Federal Circuit"); see also R. Polk Wagner, The Claim Construction
Project, http://predictor.claimconstruction.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) ('The predictor
tool uses the results of statistical regression analysis of the effect of panel membership on the
results (methodological approach: holistic, procedural) of claim construction opinions.").
Speaking for the other side of the bench, Judge Michel contends that the complaints of panel
dependency are "exaggerated." Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1177, 1191 (1999).
In support of Wagner's theory that the panel composition effects claim construction
outcome, consider the following tale. In November 2004, the Federal Circuit announced plans
to experiment with pre-announcing panel composition one week prior to oral arguments. The
Federal Circuit canceled the experiment prior to the June 2005 sessions without explanation.
One explanation for cancellation of the pilot program may be the observation by Judge Mayer,
during oral argument in the Apotex v. Pfizer case in March 2005, that "maybe posting paneling
is a very, very bad thing." See Dennis Crouch, CAFC Judge Mayer: "maybe posting paneling
is a very, very bad thing.", PATENTLY-0, Mar. 14, 2005, http://patentlaw.typepad.com
/patent/2005/03/. Judge Mayer was reacting to a decision by Pfizer to execute a covenant not
to sue Apotex in a case involving declaratory judgment jurisdiction based on an Abbreviated
New Drug Application ("ANDA''), after learning that Mayer, who had previously stated in
another case that ANDA filing did create reasonable apprehension of suit, was on the panel.
See id.
51. See infra Part II.C (discussing Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips Ill), 415 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006)).
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and there is no evidence that the reversal rates will be significantly
decreased. 52
B. The Twisted Path of Claim Construction Jurisprudence
The current state of claim construction affairs hails back at least as far as
1995, when the Federal Circuit decided Markman. 53 In that case, the court
concluded that claim construction was a matter of law to be decided by the
court. 54 The rationale for this decision was to remove the uncertainty in
patent litigation that could result from juries performing claim construction. 55
The court later followed Markman with Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies,
Inc., 56 where the Federal Circuit determined that it would review district
court claim construction determinations de novo. 57 These two principles, that
claim construction is a matter of law and that the Federal Circuit reviews
claim construction de novo, have been considered unquestionable, although
there have been multiple recent suggestions that the court reconsider. 58
52. For example, a very quick review of Federal Circuit patent cases issued between
October 1, 2005, and July I, 2006, reveals that nearly half of the claim constructions were
reversed or modified, many resulting in the need to modify or vacate the district court's
holdings. Although this was a quite unscientific study, the main point of interest is that there
was certainly not a dramatic, or even noticeable, decrease in the number of claim construction
reversals post-Phillips.
53. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in bane), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
54. ld. at 976. That claim construction was the province of judges, not juries, was later
affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II),
517 u.s. 370,373-74 (1996).
55. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 391 ("Uniformity would, however, be ill served by
submitting issues of document construction to juries.").
56. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (in bane).
57. ld. at 1454.
58. The most prominent example of this groundswell is found in the Federal Circuit's
recent denial of a petition for rehearing en bane, in which many judges expressed at least some
interest in revisiting the principle. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d
1039, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Gajarsa, J. concurring) ("In an appropriate case [Judges Gajarsa,
Linn, and Dyk] would be willing to reconsider limited aspects of the Cybor decision."); id. at
1040 (Michel, C.J., dissenting) ("I have come to believe that reconsideration [of Cybor] is
appropriate .... "); id at 1046 (Moore, J., dissenting) ("I believe this court should have taken
[the Amgen] case en bane to reconsider its position on deference to district court claim
construction articulated in [Cybor]."); see also Phillips Ill, 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en bane) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am convinced of the futility,
indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim
construction is a matter of law devoid of any factual component."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1332 (2006); cf. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed.
Cir.) (Rader, J., dissenting) ("[N]early every judge on this court has publicly professed to
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Shortly after giving judges the task of claim construction, the Federal
Circuit issued Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 59 an opinion that
attempted to provide a hierarchy of data to be considered in claim
construction. 60 First, claim construction must always begin with the language
of the claim. 61 Terms in the claim must be given their ordinary and
customary meaning as given by a PHOSITA, 62 unless either the patentee
acted as his own lexicographer by assigning an uncustomary meaning to a
claim term or the patentee explicitly disavowed the claim scope associated
with the ordinary meaning of the term. 63 Beyond the claim terms, the district
court should consider other intrinsic evidence, such as the written description
and the prosecution history. 64 Claims must be read in light of the written
description, which "is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
term. " 65 Extrinsic evidence may be used in claim construction when the
intrinsic evidence is inconclusive or generally to educate the court about the

accord some level of deference to district courts regardless of [the Federal Circuit's] de novo
review of claim construction issues"), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 488 (2005).
59. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60. Jd. at 1582-83.
61. Jd. at 1582.
62. Id.; see also Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298
(Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The words used in the claims are examined through the viewing glass of a
person skilled in the art. In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the
claim terms, the words are presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings
attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art." (citation omitted)); Johnson
Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Multiform
Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("It is the person of
ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.").
63. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 ("[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer
and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition
of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history." (citing Hoechst
Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also lnt'l
Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
presumption that a claim term should be given its ordinary and customary meaning "will be
overcome where the patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, has set forth a definition for
the term different from its ordinary and customary meaning or where the patentee has
disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using words or expressions ... representing a
clear disavowal of claim scope.").
64. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83. However, there is at least the suggestion that if the
claim term is unambiguous and clear on its face, there is no need to consider any intrinsic
evidence. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
65. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
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technolog~, but it may never be used to vary or contradict the claim
language. 6
Beyond the evidence hierarchy set forth in Vitronics, claim construction
jurisprudence provides a number of canons of construction to assist in claim
interpretation.67 Unfortunately, the utility of each of these canons is cabined
by subsequent limitations thereof. Canons include that a claim should be
interpreted to maintain its validity,68 that a correct interpretation rarely
excludes the preferred embodiment,69 that a narrow construction is preferred
to a broad one,70 that each claim within a patent should have a different
scope, 71 and that limitations cannot be imported from the specification or
prosecution history. 72 For much of the history of judicial claim construction,
there was little more guidance than this.
Not surprisingly, with this sparse amount of guidance provided by the
Federal Circuit, there remained many questions about the claim construction
process: Where is the line between reading the claims in light of the
specification and reading in limitations from the specification? Where is the
line between using extrinsic evidence to educate the court versus to inform
claim construction? How explicit does one have to be in order to be one's
own lexicographer or to disavow scope? Who is the PHOSIT A and how do

66. /d. at 1584.
67. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("In addition, a number of canons, such as the doctrine of claim differentiation, guide
our construction of all patent claims."). For additional discussion of claim construction
canons, see infra Part Ill.
68. See, e.g., Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Med. Tech., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[C]laims can only be construed to preserve their validity where the
proposed claim construction is 'practicable,' is based on sound claim construction principles,
and does not revise or ignore the explicit language of the claims."); see also Phillips Ill, 415
F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006); Modine
Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
69. See, e.g., Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 904 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583-84 (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78
F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
70. See, e.g., Rousey Pharrns., Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (limiting this canon to the "unusual case" where the patentee made two
contradictory representations of scope); Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73
F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
71. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (cautioning that "the doctrine of claim differentiation can not broaden claims
beyond their correct scope, determined in light of the specification and the prosecution history
and any relevant extrinsic evidence").
72. See, e.g., Housey Pharms., 366 F.3d at 1355; Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living
Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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we know what he thinks? How does one determine the ordinary and
customary meaning of a claim term?
Oddly enough, it was in attempting to answer this last question-that is,
how to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term-the
judges on the Federal Circuit found themselves soundly divided, a division
that eventually prompted the Federal Circuit to attempt to clarify its claim
construction jurisprudence. In October 2002, the Federal Circuit issued Texas
Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, lnc.,73 which represented to many a
dramatic change in claim construction jurisprudence74 and was initially
hailed by the patent bar. Although Vitronics had reserved a special place for
dictionaries/5 Texas Digital is considered to have raised dictionaries to the
primary source for claim interpretation. 76 However, as dictionary use at the
Federal Circuit grew, 77 it became clear that not all judges were on board with
the changed methodology. 78 Even within the camp of dictionary-use
proponents, there were disagreements as to which words to define, which

73. 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
74. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 38, at 148 (noting that Texas Digital "represents
another step, although perhaps a side-step, in the evolution of claim construction at the
Federal Circuit, if not an outright rejection of the Vitronics paradigm"); Brenda Sandburg,
Look up Words in a . . . Dictionary? Federal Circuit Zigzags on the Legal Validity of
Everyday Definitions, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 2004, at 12 (asserting that "the Federal Circuit shook
things up" when it issued Texas Digital).
75. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that although dictionaries and treatises are extrinsic evidence, "they are worthy of
special note" and "[j]udges are free to consult such resources at any time . . . to better
understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when
construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition
found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents").
76. See Holbrook, supra note 38, at 148 ("Texas Digital elevated dictionaries to a
primary source of identifying the ordinary meaning of a term."); Joseph Scott Miller & James
A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the
Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 829, 844 (2005) (pointing out the shift from "a heavy presumption
of ordinary meaning to the presumption in favor of a dictionary definition" (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted)).
77. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 76, at 845-51 (documenting the increase in
dictionary usage at the Federal Circuit).
78. See, e.g., Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting in part) (asserting that the "majority gives heed to the general rules of construction
but then proceeds to ascertain the 'plain and ordinary meaning' of the term 'board' from
various dictionaries[, and] establishes a duel between dictionary definitions and then selects
one of the various definitions to support its results"), withdrawn, substituted opinion at 424
F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

2006]

UNGUISTICS AND PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

77

dictionary to use, which definition within any given dictionary should be
chosen, and even when to stop defining. 79
And so, the notion that Texas Digital was going to pave the way for
consistent and certain claim constructions rapidly fell apart. The court was
left with the muddled principles and canons that had previously existed,
along with this newly introduced chaos driven by dictionary use. The two
fundamental obstacles to consistent claim construction remained: where does
one find the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term, and to what
extent is the specification to be used in interpreting claims. Each side of the
dictionary debate found support in its answer to these questions. On one
hand, the dictionary is the perfect place to find the ordinary and customary
meaning, and the role of the specification is largely to ensure that the
patentee has not disavowed or otherwise disclaimed the scope of the claim
term as defined in a dictionary, and any other use of the specification invites
impermissible reading of limitations into the claims. On the other hand, the
argument is that the specification is the best place to determine the ordinary
and customary meaning of the term. The judges on the Federal Circuit
essentially formed two camps, with each trying to satisfy, at least first, one of
the two obstacles. 80 It was the increased frequency in clashes between these
camps that gave rise to Phillips. 81

C. Phillips v. AWH Corp.
The Phillips case presented the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to
clarify its claim construction jurisprudence, particularly as there was a
schism between the dictionary-dependent judges and the specificationdependent judges. In particular, the panel majority concluded that the correct
interpretation of the disputed term "baffles" excluded structures that
79. See infra notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
80. See Nard, Process Considerations, supra note 47, at 367-71; Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 31, at 1155. Although the factions on either side of the Phillips
debate do not line up precisely with the divisions noted in these commentators' papers, these
groupings are fairly representative.
81. See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips 1), 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir.) (relying
primarily on the specification, while dissenting opinion invoked the dictionary), vacated en
bane, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in
part en bane, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006); Nystrom,
374 F.3d 1105 (relying on dictionary definitions, but dissent argued for more reliance on the
specification). It was from these split opinions that the divergent views of the court became
clear, leading to the granting of en bane treatment to "resolve issues concerning the
construction of patent claims." See Phillips II, 376 F.3d at 1382.
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extended at a ninety-degree angle from the wall, based on a variety of
instances in the written description that referred to "baffles" as being
"disposed at angles which tend to deflect the bullets." 82 The dissent, on the
other hand, argued that the majority had improperly read in a limitation from
the specification, noting that "the parties ha[d] stipulated that 'baffles' are a
'means for obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of something,"' and
that the majority had agreed with that stipulation as the ordinary meaning. 83
Because there was nothing in the specification to limit or disclaim the
ordinary meaning, and because the objective of impact resistance was only
one of several objectives of the invention, the dissent concluded that "there is
no reason to supplement the plain meaning of the claim language with a
limitation from the preferred embodiment" and that the dictionary-derived
ordinary meaning should be used. 84
On petition for rehearing en bane, the Federal Circuit seized this
opportunity to "resolve issues concerning the construction of patent claims
raised by the now-vacated panel majority and dissenting opinions,"85 that is,
to resolve the split between the dictionary-dependent and the specificationdependent factions. The en bane order posed seven questions (or eight,
counting the question raised by the concurrence) designed to get at the heart
of the claim construction controversy, 86 although a fair summary of the
document as a whole might read, "Claim construction, please discuss." Some
of the questions were aimed squarely at choosing between the dictionarydependent and specification-dependent approaches. 87 Others were directed
toward elaborating on one approach or the other. 88 Finally, the Federal

82. Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1212-14 (citing Steel Shell Modules for Prisoner Detention
Facilities, U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798, col.5 ll. 17-19 (filed Apr. 14, 1986) (issued July 7,
1987)).
83. See id. at 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
84. !d. at 1218.
85. Phillips II, 376 F.3d at 1382.
86. See id. at 1382-84.
87. See id. at 1383. The first question asks whether "the public notice function of patent
claims [is] better served by referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries
... or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the specification." /d. The
fourth question asks, "Instead of viewing the [competing] claim construction methodologies ..
. as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the two approaches be treated as
complementary methodologies such that . . . a patentee must satisfy both limiting
methodologies in order to establish the claim coverage it seeks?" /d.
88. See id. Question two presents a laundry list of questions relating to dictionary usage,
such as: "What use should be made of general as opposed to technical dictionaries?" and
"How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions
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Circuit posed a question about claim construction generally and without
regard to the two competing approaches, asking whether, consistent with
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, it is appropriate for the
Federal Circuit to defer "to any aspect of trial court claim construction
rulings," and if so, "to what extent."8 Judge Rader, in a concurring opinion,
raised the question of whether claim construction is "amenable to resolution
by resort to strictly algorithmic rules," or whether it would be "better
achieved by using the order or tools relevant in each case to discern the
meaning of terms according to the understanding of one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention. " 90
Given the ever-growing dissatisfaction with claim construction
procedures and the irritation of clients at the uncertainty in patent scope and
notice, the patent bar bristled with anticipation. 91 Lawyers and commentators
tried to predict the outcome. 92 Parties ranging from bar associations and legal
organizations to corporations and law firms filed amici curiae briefs. 93 Seven
of the same term?" /d. Question three similarly probes the depths of the specification
approach. See id.
89. See id. Then-Chief Judge Mayer dissented from the en bane order, remarking, "Until
the court is willing to reconsider its holdings in [Markman I] and [Cybor Corp.], that claim
construction is a pure question of law subject to de novo review in this court, any attempt to
refine the process is futile." /d. at 1384 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
90. /d. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring).
91. See Sean A. Passino et al., En Bane Decisions Play Important Role in Recent Patent
Cases, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28,2005, at S1 ("[I]f all seven of the issues identified in the [Phillips]
order were to be decided, then the Phillips case would most likely overshadow in importance
all previous Federal Circuit opinions since at least [Markman]." (citation omitted)); see also
Christine Hines, Court Mulls Way to Interpret Patent Terms: 'Phillips' May be Biggest
Claims Interpretation Case Since 'Markman', NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 10 (predicting,
after issuance of the en bane order, that "[b]ar and trade associations and the PTO are
expected to respond in droves to the court's invitation to file amicus briefs"); infra note 94
and accompanying text (discussing the significant interest in the Phillips oral argument).
92. For example, consider an entry on patent attorney Dennis Crouch's blog following
the oral argument in Phillips III. See Dennis Crouch, Phillips v. AWH: Review of Oral
Arguments on Claim Construction Methodology, PATENTLY-0, Feb. 8, 2005,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/02/phillips_v_awh_.html (predicting, after oral
argument, that dictionaries will take on a less-important status).
93. See Phillips III, 415 F.3d 1303, 1306-08 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (listing amici
briefs, including: bar associations, such as the Federal Circuit Bar Association and the
American Bar Association; legal organizations, such as the Intellectual Property Owners
Association, The Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago, the American Intellectual
Property Law Association, and the Association of Corporate Counsel; corporations, such as
Novartis Pharmaceuticals, et al., Intel Corporation, et al., and VISA U.S.A., Inc., et al.; and
law firms, such as Sughrue Mion, PLLC and the Association of Patent Law Firms), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
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months and thirty-something amici briefs later, the Federal Circuit heard oral
argument from the parties as well as the Office of the Solicitor for the Patent
Office, before a standing-room only crowd. 94 After another five months,
nearly one year after taking Phillips en bane, the Federal Circuit issued the
eagerly awaited opinion, which sadly turned out to be nothing worth waiting
for.
Instead of embracing the opportunity, the Federal Circuit withdrew to the
same unclear method of claim construction that had always existed. In fact,
the court made no bones about this retreat-holding out the Markman and
Vitronics cases, as well as the more recent case lnnova/Pure Water, Inc. v.
Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 95 the court said: "What we said in
those cases bears restating, for the basic principles of claim construction
outlined there are still applicable, and we reaffirm them today." 96 To
reiterate, claims define the invention,97 the words of the claim are to be given
their ordinary and customary meaning as they would have to a PHOS IT A at
the time of invention, 98 and the intrinsic record provides the context in which
the PHOSIT A would read the claim term. 99
The question of the hour remained, however, as to how to determine
what a term would mean to a PHOSIT A. Rather than providing a pragmatic
answer, the court regurgitated some well-worn guidelines. To wit, the claims
themselves may provide meaning, both by viewing a term in context and by
94. See Eric Yeager, Case Touted as 'Battle Over Dictionaries' Focuses on Whether
Narrowing Was Proper, BNA's PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Feb. 11, 2005, at 357;
Asian Baghdadi, Meaning What? As Federal Circuit Judges Discussed Role of Dictionaries in
Construing Patent Terms, Dream of Definitive Rule Seemed to Fade, LEGAL TiMES, Apr. 4,
2005, at 18 (describing the line to get "tickets" and the overflow crowd listening to argument
via audio feed).
95. 381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
96. Phillips lll, 415 F.3d at 1312.
97. See id. (citing Innova, 381 F.3d at 1115; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in bane),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
98. See id. at 1312-13 (citing lnnova, 381 F.3d at 1116).
99. See id. at 1313. The court stated:
It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes
the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the patent
documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field .... Thus the court starts the
decisionmaking process by reviewing the same resources as would that person, viz.,
the patent specification and the prosecution history.
/d. (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
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virtue of claim differentiation. 100 "[T]he specification is always highly
relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the
single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." 101 The specification not
only "necessarily informs the proper construction of the claims," 102 but also
"may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that
differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess." 103 For these reasons,
"[i]t is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim
construction, to rely heavil(c on the written description for guidance as to the
meaning of the claims." 04 Consistent with Vitronics, the court again
relegated extrinsic evidence to a position somewhat less than intrinsic
evidence because of its various infirmities, but noted that extrinsic evidence
(particularly dictionaries and treatises) can help a court to understand the
underlying technology. 105 As the court itself admitted, none of this was
particularly earth-shaking: "[T]he principles outlined above have been
articulated on numerous occasions .... " 106
As to dictionary usage, the Federal Circuit seemingly drew a distinction
between determining the ordinary meaning of general terms and technical
terms, allowing dictionary use for definition of general terms, but
discouraging use in technical situations. 107 Although the court implicitly
eviscerated the use of dictionaries by this statement, the Federal Circuit did
not leave it at that. The court acknowledged, "Consulting the written
I 00. See id. at 1314. The doctrine of claim differentiation assumes that different claims
have different scope.
According to the doctrine of claim differentiation, in interpreting the scope of claim
1, a court looks at claim 2. The court notes that claim 2 narrows claim 1 by restricting
the biological material to "human" biological material. This aids the judge in
determining that claim 1 is not limited to human biological material, else the two
claims would present a redundancy. Therefore, the court concludes that claim 1
embraces some non-human biological materials.
Paul M. Janicke, The Crisis in Patent Coverage: Defining Scope of an Invention by Function,
8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 187 n.l71 (1994); see also 5A DonaldS. Chisum, CHISUM ON
PATENTS§ 18.03[6], at 18-522 to -529 (2005).
101. Phillips III, 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).
102. ld. at 1316.
103. Id.
104. ld. at 1317.
105. Id. at 1318.
106. Id. at 1319.
107. Id. at 1314 (extolling dictionary use where "the ordinary meaning of claim
language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay
judges").
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description and prosecution history as a threshold step in the claim
construction process, before any effort is made to discern the ordinary and
customary meanings attributed to the words themselves, invites a violation of
our precedent counseling against importing limitations into the claims." 108
However, the court held that the dictionary-heavy approach placed too much
reliance on extrinsic sources and not enough on the specification and
prosecution history. 109 The Phillips III opinion characterized Texas Digital as
limiting "the role of the specification in claim construction to serving as a
check on the dictionary meaning of a claim term if the specification requires
the court to conclude that fewer than all the dictionary definitions apply, or if
the specification contains a sufficiently specific alternative definition or
disavowal." 110 Noting that the dictionary-heavy inquiry is focused on the
abstract meaning of the word, rather than the meaning in context, the Federal
Circuit concluded that there is then a risk of "systematic overbreadth."'" The
court did point out, however, that dictionary use is not precluded and that
such sources "are often useful to assist in understanding the commonly
understood meaning of words." 112
And so, the state of claim construction today is barely, if at all, different
from the landscape prior to Phillips, a fact that Judge Mayer publicized in
dissent: "[W]e say nothing new, but merely restate what has become the
practice over the last ten years-that we will decide cases according to
whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire, or at least allows
us a seemingly plausible way out of the case." 113 The majority seems hesitant
to even try to provide clear guidelines:
[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.
Nor is the court barred from considering any particular sources or required to
analyze sources in any specific sequence, as long as those sources are not
used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic
114
evidence.

108. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The Phillips Ill decision also attempts to explain how to avoid this "cardinal sin"-and yet, its
instructions are incomprehensible. See Phillips l/1, 415 F.3d at 1323.
109. Phillips ll/, 415 F.3d at 1319-23.
110. /d. at 1320.
111. /d. at 1321.
112. /d. at 1322.
113. /d. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
114. /d. at 1324 (majority opinion).
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There has to be a better way to approach claim construction.
III. A LINGUISTICS-BASED APPROACH TO CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

[S]hared command of a language equips us to know one
another's meaning without needing to arrive at that knowledge by
interpretation, because it equips us to hear someone else's meaning in
his words. 115
Claim construction is, to be sure, a difficult task. "[P]atent[s] consist[] of
legal language commingled with technical verbiage, the latter being the pillar
on which its meaning stands." 116 Neither legal language nor technical
verbiage provides consistent, easily defined terms, and both legal and
technical languages are often a field apart from the English language. In fact,
Senior Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit has remarked that "reading
[patent] claims is an art of sorts, involving half technology and half
linguistics." 117 And yet, the Federal Circuit has rarely mentioned linguistics
in its claim construction opinions, 118 and it certainly did not consider
linguistic approaches when it wrote the Phillips opinion. 119 In fact, this
115. John McDowell, Wittgenstein on Following a Rule, in MEANING AND REFERENCE
257, 286 (A.W. Moore ed., 1993).
116. M. Reed Staheli, Deserved Deference: Reconsidering the De Novo Standard of
Review for Claim Construction, 3 MARQ. INrELL. PROP. L. REv. 181, 189 (1999); see also
Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Perspectives on Patent Claim Construction: Re-Examining
Markman v. Westview Instruments Through linguistic and Cognitive Theories of
Decisionmaking, 12 U. BALT. INrELL. PROP. L.J. 173,202-03 (2004) ("Most patents are indeed
elaborate instruments, embodying considerable technical knowledge in a wide range of
substantive fields.").
117. S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First
Century: Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 71.
118. On the rare occasions when the Federal Circuit has even mentioned the word
"linguistics," it is most often a quotation of or reference to Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v.
Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998), where the Federal Circuit stated, "Courts
must exercise caution lest dictionary definitions ... be converted into technical terms of art
having legal, not linguistic, significance." Other contexts include accusing a litigant of
"linguistic chicanery," DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2001 ), or cautioning judges from "imposing their own subjective linguistic values on a public
decision," K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
119. Not only did the Federal Circuit fail to consider linguistic approaches in Phillips
Ill, it seems that the court completely ignored consistency of claim construction and the
related issues of uncertainty in litigation and ineffective public notice. The method espoused
in Phillips Ill does nothing to improve these problems.
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Article suggests that the Federal Circuit's main failure thus far in its claim
construction jurisprudence is that the court is not even asking the right
question-what does a term mean, and if we don't know, how do we find
out?
Claim construction is, at its core, a search for the meanings of words
used in a particular language-that is, the language of patent claims. The
most natural place to begin a search for the meanings of words would be
linguistics-the study of language-and a search for that "shared command
of language." 120 This Article suggests that viewing claim construction
through the lens of traditional linguistic analysis methodologies would prove
to be a better approach. Rather than relying on well-worn and tired claim
construction platitudes, the Federal Circuit should provide clear and
linguistically sound guidelines for claim construction and thereby improve
consistency and decrease the lack of certainty in claim construction. To do
so, this Article argues that by formalizing some of the voluntary and
involuntary processes of understanding language 121 and by applying these
processes to claim construction, the Federal Circuit is more likely to obtain
appropriate and consistent definitions of patent claim terms.
A. Quick Background in Linguistics

It is difficult, if not d~ceptive, to attempt to separate the scientific study
of language, known as "structural" or "descriptive" linguistics, from other
elements of linguistic study, including philosophic, psychological, and
anthropological concerns. 122 Descriptive or structural linguistics, however,
more easily lends itself to the creation of guidelines and rules for claim
construction and will be the main focus of this Article. Although descriptive
or structural linguistics covers a wide range of studies having in common the
unconscious psychological mechanisms by which we make and interpret

120. See infra Part III.B.l.
121. Arguably, this should be what is already occurring: "A common mechanism
underlying [most lawyerly behavior, including rule analysis, advocacy, and crossexamination] is the structure of language and its relationship to precise analysis .... Lawyers,
scholars, and teachers perform these operations naturally, with varying effectiveness, without
self-conscious analysis of the intellectual processes." Irvin C. Rutter, Law, Language, and
Thinking Like a Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1303, 1310 (1993). Although performed
involuntarily, Professor Rutter-and this paper-argue that formalizing and understanding the
process will lead to improved performance. Id. at 1303-05.
122. See id. at 1312.
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utterances in our native language, 123 there are three core areas that have
relevance to the quest for patent claim term meaning-semantics, syntax,
and pragmatics. 124 Semantics is the discipline within linguistics devoted to
the study of the meanings of words and combinations of words. 125 Syntax
studies how phrases and sentences are structured and how these
combinations of words then attain meaning. 126 Pragmatics is the study of
language in context, or what meaning is given to a word by a particular
reader in a particular situation. 127 In reading, speaking, and understanding
everyday English, a person informally uses components of all of these
skills. 128
At the heart of claim construction is the search for meaning, and so it
would seem that semantics is the place to start. A semanticist constructs a
theory of what a word means by examining how a native speaker of the
relevant language uses that word in combination with other words. 129
Semantics starts with a basic, but important, assumption: a person's
linguistic capabilities are based on the knowledge he has. 130 In particular,
there is an abstract notion about what words mean based on prior encounters
with the term. From this abstract notion, a contextual definition can then be
formed based on the particular circumstances in which the word arises for
this encounter, which then may provide a refined abstract notion directing a
subsequent encounter. For example, if someone hands a child a round article
of food and tells the child it is a "cookie," the child, based on prior
I23. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Linguistics and the Composition of Legal
Documents: Border Crossings, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 697,699 (1998).
I24. The five areas are phonology (pronunciation), morphology (word formation),
syntax (combination of words and phrases), semantics (meaning), and pragmatics (language in
context). See id. at 699-700.
I25. See GEORGE L. DILLON, INTRODUCfiON TO CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTIC
SEMANTICS I (I977); JAMES R. HURFORD & BRENDAN HEASLEY, SEMANTICS: A COURSEBOOK
I (I983).
I26. See ANDREW CARNIE, SYNTAX: A GENERATIVE INTRODUCTION 3-4 (2002).
I27. See JOHN I. SAEED, SEMANTICS I7 -I8 ( I997).
I28. This use of common components, or a universal grammar, is common to all
speakers; however, these common components are in contrast to deep structures, which are
attributes of language which human beings generally do not share-the human linguistic
ability that exists in the mind of the speaker and the rules that are part of the speaker's
unconscious knowledge. See NOAM CHOMSKY, ESSAYS ON FORM AND INTERPRETATION 2-3
( I977); NOAM CHOMSKY, STUDIES ON SEMANTICS IN GENERATIVE GRAMMAR II-I2, 65-67
(I972); NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND I2-20 (I968).
I29. Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWAL. REv. 54 I, 545 (I988).
130. See SAEED, supra note I27, at I.
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experience, will be expecting the article of food to be sweet and tasty. If the
child has had only chocolate chip cookies prior to this encounter, the child
may even be expecting chocolate chips to be baked in the cookie. However,
if the cookie this time is instead a peanut butter cookie, the child will refine
his notion of cookie to include both peanut butter and chocolate chip cookies,
but the conventional understanding of "cookie" as a sweet and tasty round
treat will remain. 131
As an example of this dual level of interpretation applied to claim
construction, consider Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 132 In
that case, the claim term at issue was "about," as in the phrase of
"administering [a doseage of] about 70 mg." 133 Although the court
considered the context of the specification to determine that the patentee had
not provided a non-conventional definition, there was no consideration of the
technology area or the context surrounding the term in the claim. 134 The
Federal Circuit simply concluded, in the abstract, that the ordinary meaning
of "about" was "approximately." 135 The court then considered the contextual
meaning of "about" when it considered how "approximate" an infringing
product needed to be to the patented invention to fall within the claim scope.
Even though there was not an explicit, dual level of interpretation, it is clear
the first definition was simply reflective of the judges' common
understanding of the everyday term "about." Although it is not explicit in
every case, nearly every claim construction performed by the court involves
the first layer of explicating the court's collective common understanding of
a claim term-whether obtained by searching the judges' personal lexicons
or by consulting a dictionary.
Beyond the concern that the Federal Circuit does not explicitly perform a
two-step claim construction, focusing on first the abstract and then the
contextual, the court more importantly neglects other basic aspects of
linguistic analysis. For example, the idea of an extant lexicon of conventional
131. To be fair, this idea of abstract/conventional definition and contextual definition
is a bit simplistic. In reality, there may first need to be a contextual understanding to arrive at
the correct conventional understanding. For example, returning to the "cookie" example, if
instead the situations surrounding the mention of the word were a person trying to detect
spyware on his computer, the term would have an entirely different conventional meaning.
However, for the purposes of discussion, this Article will refer to the simplified dichotomy of
first, obtaining a conventionaUcommon understanding of a term, and second, refining that
understanding.
132. 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 488 (2005).
133. !d. at 1366, 1369-70.
134. !d. at 1369-72.
135. See id. at 1372.
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understanding of many words is all but absent in the Federal Circuit's claim
construction jurisprudence. Even with respect to common words, or words
used in their conventional sense, the court denies this underlying knowledge,
preferring to start the claim construction anew, as though it had had no
previous encounter with the word. In fact, the court has even resorted to
dictionaries to purportedly "define" words for which the judge certainly
already has developed a conventional, or common, understanding, rather
than using the dictionary to obtain an abstract understanding of those words
it has not previously encountered.
As to refining the abstract notion to craft a contextual definition of the
disputed term, the Federal Circuit's methodology does no better. First, when
construing claims, the Federal Circuit typically views the matter as one of a
word or a small combination of words. 136 In doing so, the court may be
neglecting another area of linguistics that is crucial to understanding
language-syntax. We gain considerable insight into meaning based on the
placement of words in phrases or sentences. By simply defining words in the
abstract, we are unable to use our syntactical intuitions to our benefit.
Second, although the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that claim terms
should be given the meanings they would have had to a PHOSIT A, 137 the
Federal Circuit has removed (in practice, if not in name) the PHOSIT A from
much of its claim construction process. 138 Pragmatics, a third area of
linguistic analysis, is intimately tied to the contextual understanding of terms
and the PHOSIT A. In concluding its claim construction by defining a
singular word or phrase in a vacuum, ignoring the PHOSITA, and denying
that it has some previous knowledge of many words, the Federal Circuit is
disregarding many of the linguistic intuitions that everyday speakers and
listeners use to understand language, which may lead to inaccurate claim
interpretations and decreased public notice. 139
136. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 41 (talking specifically about what
constitutes an "element" for the purposes of infringement analysis). Although the definition of
an "element" is potentially different than choosing a word or phrase for claim construction
purposes, the idea behind the matter of arbitrarily chunking a patent claim for any purpose is
problematic and often overlaps. See id. at 46 ("[T]he natural tendency of courts is to identify
the elements for which literal infringement is lacking as the same elements for which it
construed the claims.").
137. See Phillips lll, 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) ("The inquiry
into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term provides an objective
baseline from which to begin claim interpretation."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
138. See infra Part 111.8.4.
139. The concern has been raised that the PHOSITA is not an everyday
speakernistener and thus this analysis fails. Presumably, the PHOSITA uses the same
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B. Applying Linguistics to Claim Construction

Linguistics, as a science, has already validated the use of various tools
and theories to understand language. Because of this, there are at least five
notions from linguistics that can help shape a more consistent claim
construction methodology: (1) every reader, including a judge, possesses a
mental lexicon with a common sense (or conventional) understanding of
word meaning, which is a point from which to start when interpreting claims;
(2) there is an appropriate place for dictionary usage, which is to inform the
judge's common sense understanding about a word where he has none; (3)
patent claims have their own grammar that must inform the syntactical and
contextual analysis, but may also skew the reader's common understanding
that was obtained either from a mental lexicon or from a dictionary; (4)
regardless of the common sense understanding, the PHOSITA must be
returned to the analysis and changes must be made to the law to effectuate
the return of the PHOSITA; and (5) extensive resort to the specification and
prosecution history to divine the patentee's intent is inappropriate.
The first two prongs of the proposal are focused on the conventional, or
common, definition of terms, or the definition of words in the abstract, as
discussed above. The remaining three prongs are focused on the second level
of definition, refining the definition based on the context.
1. The Patent Lexicon
One premise of understanding language is the notion that the
listener/reader140 is not interpreting the language in a vacuum--every reader
has an internal mental lexicon or dictionary from which interpretation
begins. 141 Although this lexicon is lacking in context, it can provide a starting
linguistic intuitions as the everyday speaker or listener, defining words based on an abstract
notion refined by context, and brings only a difference in background knowledge to the table.
It is unlikely that a PHOSITA would interpret words by a wholly different procedure.
Furthermore, the canons of claim construction arguably effectuate some of the goals for
claim construction and mitigate some of the Federal Circuit's failures as discussed in this
Article, but because the canons are not uniformly employed and are hampered by limitations
on their usage, they do not fulfill the goals with sufficient certainty. This Article proposes that
the canons of claim construction can be used in conjunction with the linguistic methods
described herein to improve claim construction methodology.
140. This point is actually true of the listener/reader, as well as the speaker, who
formulates language based on this mental lexicon. For simplicity, the person attempting to
interpret the term will hereinafter be referred to as the reader.
141. See SAEED, supra note 127, at 8.
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point for claim construction by providing the conventional, or common
sense, definition of a word that is then refined via contextual analysis.
Although every speaker may not define a term identically, for words to have
meaning, the definition must stay within a common boundary when referring
to reality. It is to this conventional definition that contextual refinement is
then added to arrive at a complete definition.
As Professor Irvin Rutter explains, what we know about the non-verbal
world is obtained from our senses-sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell. 142
If a person sees an object, such as a cave, that person "would simply
experience a visual perception, that is, there would be an image or picture in
his mind's eye." 143 This would be the primary response to a visual
stimulus. 144 If that person had previously seen a cave, Professor Rutter
explains, there would be a "secondary, associated response," which would
depend on the person's prior experiences and associations. 145 Similarly, in
the verbal world, if someone would instead utter the word "cave," the
person's primary response would be a primary response to sound; the
secondary response would be the evocation of the prior experience of seeing
the cave. 146 For our purposes, then, upon hearing a word, our secondary
response (after a primary response of processing the auditory stimulus) will
be to make the association between the verbal utterance and the experiential
knowledge we have of that word. That experiential knowledge provides us
with a common understanding or conventional meaning of the word, from
which we can then layer context.
In claim construction, it is helpful to think of the Federal Circuit as a
collective entity, which has obtained, over the course of life and interpretive
experience, a conventional or common understanding of many terms, or to
put it another way, a lexicon of "ordinary and customary meaning." Unlike
with an average reader, the Federal Circuit has provided insight into its
lexicon of ordinary and customary meaning via its precedent. This Article
posits that by gathering a lexicon based on claim constructions rendered by

142. See Rutter, supra note 121, at 1317.
143. Id. at 1317-18.
144. See id. at 1318.
145. /d. (noting that the person, for example, might experience a secondary response
of comfort and relaxation based on having entered the cave to escape the rain).
146. See id. at 1319. In this complex conversion, then, between the nonverbal and the
verbal world, there are certainly philosophic, psychological, and anthropological
underpinnings that cannot be ignored, but this Article leaves those topics for another day and
focuses solely on structural linguistics and a practical approach to claim interpretation.
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the Federal Circuit, 147 to be used not to define, but to gain insight into the
collective conventional definitions of common words by the court, two
improvements will be attained. First, claim construction, as a matter of law,
will truly become more like other areas of law, where precedent about term
definitions can be argued in a subsequent, unrelated case. This is tempered,
of course, by the context in which the term is used, though the first layer of
claim construction is rarely about context. Second, applicants when drafting
patents will have some idea of the conventional understanding had by judges
as to many of the common words used in patent claims and can craft claims
accordingly. 148 Certainly, there is no benefit at this time for the Federal
Circuit to be repeatedly construing the term "about" as "approximate." 149
One common criticism of this idea is that there will be little value in such
lexicon because the Federal Circuit is defining complex, technical terms that
are highly specialized to the particular invention. However, an interesting
insight obtained during the creation of this lexicon is that it is clear that this
is not the case. 150 Most of the terms the court construes are not technical
terms. 151 Because many terms being construed by the Federal Circuit fall into
the category of non-technical terms (and in some cases, are identical to terms
already construed, such as "about"), there is value in considering the Federal
Circuit's case law as a sort of lexicon reflecting the judges' common,
conventional understanding of terms. Of course, in any case, the
conventional meaning must be tempered by context, but the conventional
147. I have already begun work in gathering this lexicon, which is on file with the
author. Inquiries and comments about the lexicon are welcome at kosenga@richmond.edu as
its creation continues.
148. One concern raised is that there may be a time lag following the creation of the
lexicon in which the conventional meanings of the terms may change. In response, the lexicon
is envisioned as a vibrant project that is regularly updated to reflect the judges' current mental
lexicon. Moreover, and more importantly, the court is often defining terms that are not
technical and are not susceptible to regular changes in meaning. See infra notes 151, 162, and
text accompanying notes 169-71.
149. Hedge terms such as "about" or "substantially" may represent a
grarnmaticalization-that is, the term has lost its substantive meaning and has instead become
part of the necessary grammatical structure. Even if this is true, there are still a significant
number of common, everyday words being defined on a regular basis by the Federal Circuit
that provide value to the notion of a lexicon.
150. There are also likely other by-products and insights provided by the collection of
Federal Circuit claim construction into a lexicon, but these topics warrant further research and
are beyond the scope of this paper.
151. For example, in 2006, the Federal Circuit construed terms such as "conventional,"
"about," "combining," and "specified time interval." See Lexicon Database (on file with
author). In fact, in Markman, the granddaddy of all claim construction cases, the term at issue
was "inventory."
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meaning provides the starting point. This Article does not suggest that this
lexicon be used prescriptively, or even to define terms; rather, it simply
represents the clearest picture we have into the judges' personal collective
internal lexicon, which should help patent drafters to draft claims that will be
understood as intended.
The Federal Circuit has arguably, but silently, blessed this approach for
words in which all that is sought is the ordinary and customary meaning (or
linguistically, the conventional meaning). In PC Connector Solutions LLC v.
SmartDisk Corp.,' 52 the magistrate at the district court level defined the
disputed term '"conventional' as referring to technologies existing at the
time of the invention," 153 by relying on the construction of that same term in
Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. Lucks Co. 154 The Federal Circuit agreed that
the ordinary and customary meaning of "conventional" was exactly as the
district court had found, thus implicitly blessing that the ordinary and
customary meaning of a claim term can be derived from precedent. 155
However, the Federal Circuit has, in other cases, rejected the idea of
"precedent" in claim construction. For example, in Medrad, Inc. v. MRI
Devices Corp.,' 56 Medrad, a medical device company, argued for a
construction of the term "substantially uniform" to be "largely, but not
wholly, the same form throughout," based on the Federal Circuit's
construction of that term in a different case having to do with detergent. 157
Noting that the "use of a term in a patent on a detergent is of little pertinence
to the use of a similar term in a patent on MRI RF coils," the court instead
defined (or perhaps declined to define) the term to mean "sufficiently
uniform" for the function. 158 The Federal Circuit admonished that "[a]
particular term used in one patent need not have the same meaning when
used in an entirely separate patent, particularly one involving different
technology. In fact, there are many situations in which the interpretations
will necessarily diverge." 159 However, in issuing this pronouncement, the
court pointed to situations where the "patentee may define a particular term
in a particular way," as well as when the term has a meaning that varies from
152. 406 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
153. !d. at 1361.
154. 264 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
155. Connector, 406 F.3d at 1363.
156. 401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
157. See id. at 1318 (noting that Medrad based its construction on the Federal Circuit's
construction of "substantially uniform" in Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
158. Medrad,401 F.3d at 1319-20.
159. /d. at 1318.
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art to art. 160 If neither of these situations are true, the court in Medrad still
cautions that "[e]ven absent an express definition of a term in the
specification or prosecution history, or a clearly established understanding of
the meaning of the term in the art, the manner in which the term is used in
the patent may dictate a definition that differs from the definition that would
be given to the same term in a different patent with a different specification
or prosecution history." 161
The Federal Circuit is not explicitly denying that there is a general
understanding of terms, just that it requires a look at context. However, this
does not defeat the value of the lexicon for the first level of claim
construction--obtaining the conventional definition of a common, everyday
English word. In these cases, the court is not pronouncing the use of a term
in a particular context, but rather expounding on the conventional, or
ordinary and customary, meaning of a term, such as "substantially" or
"connected" or "conventional." 162 In these cases, there is no reason why a
lexicon of terms defined by the Federal Circuit cannot serve as at least a
cautionary guide. The lexicon should not be used where the court is instead
defining a term in context, and moreover, care should be taken to consider
the field of art at issue, which can shape even the ordinary and customary
meaning of a particular term. 163
2. Dictionary Usage
What if the term is one that has not been previously encountered? This is
the situation in which dictionary usage makes linguistic sense-to obtain a
conventional understanding for a word where we have none. Interestingly,
and not unique to the Federal Circuit, this is not how courts most often use
dictionaries.
Resorting to a dictionary to define a term is natural: "[J]udges habitually
tum to dictionaries when faced with indeterminacy in interpreting . . .

160. /d.
161. /d.
162. Other scholars have noted additional mundane words that the Federal Circuit has
recently defined. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 53 (noting that the court has considered
disputes over the terms "a, or, to, on, about, including, and through" (internal quotation marks
and footnotes omitted)).
163. See, e.g., supra note 131 and accompanying text (cautioning that defining the
term "cookie" in its conventional sense does require one to know whether we are talking about
food or computer files).
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sentences." 164 However, in practice, this habit is not about defining a word,
but rather about verifying a meaning. Professor Craig Hoffman explains the
difference as follows: "definition" is using a dictionary to define a word that
the reader does not know, while "verification" is using a dictionary to verify
that a common English word has a meaning that the court has chosen to
assign it. 165 In verifying, the judge will pronounce a legal conclusion about a
sentence, identify a "language problem" with the text and focus on a
potentially problematic word in that text, and will cite one or more dictionary
definitions to support the conclusion that the problematic word has the
meaning originally asserted. 166 Rather than serving as a prospective inquiry
into a word's meaning, verification is, at best, an innocent retrospective
search for validity of a judge's common sense understanding of the English
language and, at worst, a result-driven no-holds-barred mission to justify and
rationalize the chosen meaning for a term. 167 Thus, verification, although
occasionally harmless, at the very least raises a specter of impropriety in the
court's construction.
An examination of claim construction in the Federal Circuit shows that
the court uses dictionaries largely for verification rather than definition. 168
Dictionaries are used most often, in fact, when the word being defined is a
simple word that most judges, and indeed most native English speakers,
would never dream of looking up in a dictionary. For just a few of the many
possible examples, the Federal Circuit has used a dictionary to define: "Pot .
. . as a rounded metal or earthen container of varying size used chiefly for
domestic purposes"; 169 "[v]isual . . . as capable of being seen"; 170 and
164. Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the
Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. PoL'Y 401,401 (2003).
165. /d. at 402.
166. /d. at417.
167. Arguably, there is a third use for dictionaries, beyond definition and
verification-that is, to determine whether a word for which you have a conventional
understanding has additional, acceptable usages. This is particularly true in exploring the
nuanced contours that might exist for everyday words. However, as it would be difficult to
separate this use from verification, I still conclude that dictionary use should be reserved for
those words for which the judge has no conventional, ordinary and customary understanding.
168. See generally Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 76 (commenting on dictionary
usage at the Federal Circuit).
169. Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 412 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICfiONARY 1774 (2002)).
170. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comrn'n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICfiONARY 2558 (1993)).
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"connect as to join, fasten or link together usually by means of something
•
•
.. 171
mtervenmg.
While these verifications of claim terms may seem harmless, dictionary
use in other cases at least appears to introduce impropriety. Consider, for
example, the Federal Circuit opinion in Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v.
Eon Labs Manufacturing, Inc. 172 There, the court was seeking to construe the
term "hydrosol." The court consulted a dictionary, which defined "'hydrosol'
as 'a sol in which the liquid is water."' 173 The court then looked up "sol,"
which was defined as "a dispersion of solid particles in a liquid colloidal
solution." 174 From here, the court went on to look up "solution." 175 The word
"solution" in the dictionary chosen by the court provided two relevant
definitions, one broad and one narrow. The Federal Circuit chose the narrow
definition, despite a lack of disavowal of claim scope that would prohibit
choosing the broader definition. 176 The narrow definition, in tum, included
the term "medicinal preparation," a term that the Federal Circuit not only felt
compelled to construe, but also resorted to an entirely different dictionary in
order to do so, resulting in what the court determined was an ambiguity. 177
Not only did the Federal Circuit chain together a series of definitions in what
seems to be an attempt to arrive at a common denominator that suited the
preferred outcome, but the court also inexplicably switched dictionaries
midstream, citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary, The Oxford
English Dictionary, and Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary. 178 Judge
Clevenger dissented, noting: "Dictionaries are fine tools to assist in the
exercise of claim interpretation, for sure, but in this case the majority has
simply overworked the dictionaries to a point of error." 179
171. Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol. Corp., 374 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 480
(1986)).
172. 363 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
173. !d. at 1308 (quoting WEBSTER'S TIDRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1110
(2002)).
174. See id. at 1309 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2167 (2002)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1309-10; id. at 1315 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 1309 (majority opinion); id. at 1315 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
179. !d. at 1316 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). It is important to note that Judge
Clevenger, at the time of Novartis, was not anti-dictionary, having used dictionaries for claim
construction on other occasions in his opinions. See, e.g., Housey Pharms., Inc. v. Astrazeneca
UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (accepting a party's dictionary-based claim
construction argument over dissent by Judge Newman, arguing against the majority's reliance
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There are other instances where the court has cited different dictionaries
for different terms without explanation, and at least one time for adjacent
words in the same claim term. In Edwards Systems Technology, Inc. v.
Digital Control Systems, Inc., 180 the court was defining the term
"semipermeable membrane." After concluding that there was no reason to
give "semipermeable membrane" anything other than its ordinary meaning,
the Federal Circuit continued: ''The term 'semipermeable' means '[p]artially
permeable' or '[a]llowing passage of certain, esp. small molecules or ions
but barring others.' 'Membrane' is defined as 'a thin soft pliable sheet or
layer esp. of animal or vegetable origin. "' 181 It is unclear why the court
would change dictionaries midstream, since the court admitted it was only
seeking the ordinary meaning and since both terms appear in each dictionary,
other than to obtain a definition that comported with the result the panel
sought. This is exemplary of verification at its best (or worst).
The Phillips court, unfortunately, incorrectly stresses that this very
situation-the simple, non-technical word-is precisely the situation in
which the court finds dictionary use to be appropriate, noting that "general
purpose dictionaries may be helpful" in cases where "the ordinary meaning
of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily
apparent even to lay judges." 182 On this point, the Federal Circuit has gotten
the approach completely wrong. Dictionaries should be used in claim
construction only to define those words for which a judge has no common
understanding. In many cases, that situation would be one in which the
disputed term is "technical verbiage," although, on occasion, it is
conceivable that a judge may not be versed in a peculiar use of a general
English term within a given field of art. If the use of dictionaries is then
largely limited to technical terminology, it would seem that a contextspecific dictionary, rather than a general dictionary, would be most
appropriate. The other shortcomings of dictionaries would still apply,
on dictionaries); Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d
1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (starting the claim construction analysis by noting that
"[d]ictionary definitions frequently are useful in th[e] process" of determining the ordinary
and customary meaning of a claim term).
180. 99 F. App'x 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although the Federal Circuit restricts the
citation of unpublished opinions, the fact that this example of apparent dictionary-shopping
appears in a non-precedential opinion does not decrease its illustrative value.
181. /d. at 918-19 (alterations in original) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1240 (1997) for the definition of "semipermeable" and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1408 (1986) for the definition of "membrane").
182. See Phillips lll, 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
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however. Questions remain as to which particular dictionary, which edition
of the particular dictionary, and which definition or definitions in that
dictionary to choose. 183 Especially in the technical fields, there may be
somewhat of a battle of the dictionaries or even a question of whether a
particular document, such as a list of definitions created by a standardssetting organization, should be held to the same esteem. 184
Another problem that dictionaries bring to bear is when to stop defining,
a problem that is not mitigated necessarily if dictionaries are limited to
technical terms for which the judge has no common understanding, such as
the term "hydrosol" in the Novartis case. In that case, arguably, "hydrosol"
fits under the criteria for dictionary use. The resulting definition includes
"sol," which too may fit under the criteria. Although the Federal Circuit then
looked up "solution," which seemingly does not fit the criteria, it may have
been within the parameters if it had chosen to look up "colloidal"-a term
also included in the definition of "sol."
Dictionary use is only appropriate where the judge has no conventional
definition for the term in question. These situations could include cases
involving technical terms with which the judge is unfamiliar or cases where
typical English terms have taken on technical meanings that vary from
conventional understanding (such as "cookie" in the computer arts). Under
no circumstances should dictionaries be used to define (or rather verify)
conventional English words in their traditional usage.
Whether the conventional, or ordinary and customary, meaning of the
term is gleaned from the Federal Circuit's collective lexicon or looked up in
a dictionary, this represents only the first step of claim construction. The
abstract conventional meaning must then be refined and reined in based on

183. These concerns are not limited to the Federal Circuit's use of dictionaries. See,
e.g., Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 227, 285-86 (1999)
(discussing problems with Supreme Court's use of dictionaries); Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old
Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2177, 2197 (2003) (same).
184. Standards-setting organizations ("SSOs") an: organizations or institutions that
create standards, at either national, transnational, or international levels. See Wikipedia,
Standards Organization, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standards_organization (last visited Feb.
18, 2007). The standards can either concern broad or narrow subject matter, and they are
typically concerned with either creating standard interfaces or standards for quality and safety.
See id. Exemplary SSO work includes W3C (World Wide Web Consortium), creating
standards for Internet matters, and IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers),
which creates standards for a wide variety of electronic products and processes, such as
wireless transmission. See id.
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the context that surrounds the term. This second step of claim construction,
contextual analysis, finds bases in both syntactical and pragmatic analysis.
3. The Grammar of Patents
Part of our understanding of English sentences is based on syntactic
ordering. That is, words appear where we expect them to appear and usually
in the context in which we expect them. For example, we can understand the
sentence, "The rose grew in the garden." We begin to lose some of that
understanding when the words are rearranged, although the parts of speech
of the various words are still in the same place: "The garden grew in the
rose." We lose even further understanding when words are used in
unexpected ways and where the words lose their part-of-speech identity:
"The grew garden rose in the."
Unfortunately, either due to the difficulty in describing something in a
single sentence or the difficulty in describing something for which there may
be no words, patentees often use words in unexpected ways. For example,
words are frequently used outside of their typical parts of speech or are
combined with other words that are not normally associated together. Some
people may argue that this is the beauty of the English language. We are
likely to form a reasonably accurate mental picture at hearing a sentence
such as: "The children kangarooed off the wall." 185 Although the judge may
have a sufficient understanding of what a word typically means, when the
word is used out of context or as a different part of speech, the term loses
some of its descriptive precision at the very least. However, it is this very
level of precision that is required in defining the patentee's rights and
providing sufficient notice to the public.
In some cases, we may be able to reflexively read the sentence, moving
the term to a sentence position with which we are more familiar. For
example, the Federal Circuit had the opportunity to define the term "glide
surface." 186 Although the court was not perplexed by the use of "glide" as an
adjective, rather than its traditional usage as a verb or noun, one of the
parties at least made an argument that the noun form, not the verb form,
should be used. 187 But it is possible to read this phrase as "surface on which
185. Thank you, Kelly Brest van Kampen, for this example.
186. See Vander1ande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int'1 Trade Comm'n, 366 F.3d 1311,
1317-24 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
187. ld. at 1321 ("Vanderlande's argument rests on a long series of tenuous
assumptions: the word 'glide' in the claim term 'glide surface' is based on the noun form, not
the verb form ....").
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the object glides," or another similarly framed statement. 188 Not all phrases,
however, permit a similar reordering. Moreover, in so reordering, it is
possible that the true meaning is lost in translation.
Linguistic intuitions, such as those derived from syntax, are the key to
sentence meaning. 189 Current linguistic theory hypothesizes that all mature
speakers in a language share a common grammar, i.e., the internalized set of
rules that guides language production and interpretation. 190 Sentence
interpretation is more than defining the words that comprise it-rather, the
key is to understand how the grammar generates and interprets the syntactic
and semantic relationships among the phrasal categories that the sentence
contains. 191 Professor Hoffman provides the following simplified example as
descriptive of the way grammar evokes linguistic intuitions that lead to
meaning:
2.(a) John thinks he won.
(b) He thinks John won .
. . . [I]n Sentence 2(a), the pronoun "he" may refer to John or some other
man .... [l]n Sentence 2(b), the pronoun "he" cannot refer to John but can
only refer to another man ....
3. Mter he ate lunch, John left .
. . . "[H]e" in Sentence 3 may refer to John, whereas the pronoun in
Sentence 2(b) cannot. Why is that so? ... By comparing these sentences, and
analyzing their similarities and differences, linguists can test their hypotheses
about what those rules might be. 192

188. It is not practical, however, to insist that the patentee rewrite the claim as
suggested, because the term "glide," in addition to serving as a descriptor, also serves as an
identifier, so that other surfaces may be discussed as well. For example, in the peanut butter
and jelly sandwich example above, there are "perimeter surfaces" and "contact surfaces." See
supra note 18. The terms "perimeter" and "contact" not only describe where these surfaces are
likely located, but also serve to differentiate them from each other.
189. See Hoffman, supra note 164, at 406.
190. See DAVID LIGHTFOOT, THE LANGUAGE LoTTERY: TOWARD A BIOLOGY OF
GRAMMARS 22-24 (1982); Stephen R. Anderson & David W. Lightfoot, The Human Language
Faculty as an Organ, 62 ANN. REV. PHYSIOLOGY 697, 697 (1999).
191. See JANET DEAN FODOR, SEMANTICS: THEORIES OF MEANING IN GENERATIVE
GRAMMAR 160 (1977).
192. Hoffman, supra note 164, at 407.
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Patent drafting rules do provide some guidance in this area, especially
with respect to an antecedent basis. Specifically, a claim will be found
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 if the claim recites language lacking an
antecedent basis. Consider the following exemplary claim: "A chair
comprising a back member, a seat member, and a plurality of vertical support
members, where the chair legs are made of wood." 193 Arguably, the term
"legs" is an alternate reference to "vertical support members," just as "he" in
example 3 above may refer to "John." However, like example 3, "he" is not
clear-it could mean either John or some other man; both are indefinite
because the "pronoun," or unspecific term, lacks antecedent basis. In the case
of the chair, while "legs" may be included within the realm of "vertical
support members," the terms are of arguably different scope and cannot be
used to represent the same thing. 194 Similarly, the antecedent basis
requirement of patent law prohibits referring to an element as "the" element,
without first having introduced the element as "an" element. That is, a claim
may not read, "A chair comprising a seat member, a back member, and the
plurality of legs." In this case, the element "plurality of legs" has not been
initially introduced with an "an," so the specific reference to "the" plurality
of legs lacks antecedent basis. 195 Despite avoiding indefiniteness based on
antecedent basis, there remain instances where syntactic analysis and
linguistic intuitions based on word ordering would assist claim interpretation.
The Federal Circuit has at least on occasion paid lip service to the idea of
syntactic analysis. 196 For example, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire

193. For a very similar exemplary claim and explanation of antecedent basis, see John
M. Romary & Arie M. Michelsohn, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman: How the
Federal Circuit Interprets Claims, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1887, 1893 (1997) ("A chair comprising
a back member, seat member, and vertical support members, wherein the chair legs are made
of wood ...."(internal quotation marks omitted)). Be aware, however, that this claim is likely
deficient for other reasons, such as the fact that there is no statement as to how the pieces are
connected.
194. See id.
195. The following proper claim presents a useful comparison: "A chair comprising a
seat member, a back member, and a plurality of legs, wherein the legs are made of metal."
196. For additional syntactical analyses, see York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm &
Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (''The language and syntax of the claim
preclude a functional definition of 'substantial part."'); Candela Laser Corp. v. Cynosure, Inc.,
No. 94-1515, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12622, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 24, 1995) (''The syntax of
the claims indicates that the phrase 'the light' logically refers to the light that has been
previously set forth in the claims ...."); Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("In determining the true meaning of the language of the [claim], the grammatical structure
and syntax thereof may be instructive.").
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& Rubber Co., 197 the court considered syntactic clues in interpreting the

claim language "crystallizing the granulate to a density of at least 1.390
g/cm3 under forced motion at a temperature of 220° C to 260° C under an
inert gas atmosphere." 198 The dispute was over what was to be heated to 220°
C to 260° C. In determining that, the court noted:
To determine the proper referent for the claim's temperature clause, this
court examines principally the claim language and any syntactic signs of its
meaning.
The claim calls for "crystallizing the granulate to a density of at least
1.390 g/cm3 under forced motion at a temperature of 220° C to 260° C under
an inert gas atmosphere." In this context, ... the word "to" means "with the
resultant condition of' or "toward a specified state," the word "at" means "in
the state or condition of," and the word "under" means "undergoing or
receiving the effects of." Under normal rules of syntax, therefore, "at" and
"under" implies a controlled value (such as a process parameter), whereas
"to" implies a measured and intended goal or condition (such as a polymer
temperature). This context suggests that a step performed "at" a temperature
indicates a process condition, not the condition of the matter under
199
process.

In the Eastman Kodak case, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that
attention to syntax can assist in interpretation. However, that idea needs to be
taken one step further, because, for better or for worse, patent claims have
their own grammar that is not consistent with proper English grammar. We
need to study this grammar to understand the rules that are true for patent
claims, and then apply these grammar rules when interpreting claims. Patent
attorneys and judges are undoubtedly somewhat familiar at an unconscious
level with the rules of patent grammar, but it should be possible to explore
these rules in detail and possibly develop some prescriptive guidelines for
197. 114 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
198. See id. at 1551 (emphasis omitted).
199. /d. at 1553 (citations omitted). It is interesting to note that the definitions of "to,"
"at," and "under" were obtained from Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary. Id.
(quoting WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNNERSITY DICf!ONARY 1214, 134, 1256 (1988)). It is
also interesting to note that Judge Lourie, who has a scientific background, dissented-in-part
based on this construction, stating that "[w]hen the granulate is crystallized 'at a temperature,'
the granulate is at that temperature." Id. at 1561 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis
omitted).

2006]

LINGUISTICS AND PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

101

patent grammar as well. A detailed study of patent grammar is beyond the
scope of this Article and is the subject of a follow-up piece to this Article.
4. Bring Back the PHOSITA
Beyond information that can be obtained from the syntactic clues, there
are other forms of context that assist in the determination of meaning,
covered by a branch of linguistics known as pragmatics. There are two types
of pragmatics. "Linguistic pragmatics" refers to the language surrounding the
phrase in question, for example, the words in the surrounding phrases that
explain to us what a pronoun means. Patent law covers linguistic pragmatics
in the rules about antecedent basis. 200 However, "situational pragmatics"
refers to non-linguistic factors that affect meaning, i.e., the underlying
knowledge of the speaker that brings context. "[T]he meaning of a sentence
only has application ... against a background of assumptions and practices
that are not representable as a part of the meaning." 201 This is precisely the
information that the PHOSIT A is supposed to lend to claim constructionthe underlying "background of assumptions and practices" that the person
having ordinary skill in the art would understand and use to base his
understanding of the claim terms in question.
The practical problem with applying situational pragmatics to claim
construction is the question of where the "background of assumptions and
practices" comes from. In order for the public notice function to be served,
the background of assumptions and practices must come from some sort of
community that has both a common understanding of structure as well as a
shared reaction to the text. 202 It can not derive solely from information in the
mind of the applicant?03 Although patent professionals (that is, practitioners
and potentially academics) have been said to form an interpretive
community, 204 the community whose understanding and shared reaction

200. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
201. John R. Searle, The Background of Meaning, in SPEECH Acr THEORY AND
PRAGMATICS 221,221 (John R. Searle eta!. eds., 1980); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note
4, at 50 ("[M]eaning simply cannot be found without reference to context that lies beyond the
document itself.").
202. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533,533 n.2 (1983)
(referring to the philosopher Wittgenstein).
203. See infra Part III.B.5.
204. John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place
of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REv. 183, 184-85 n.6
(1999).
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should be the focus of interpretation is that collectively represented by the
PHOSITA.
Nearly every Federal Circuit opinion on claim construction refers to the
PHOSIT A. In fact, the Phillips opinion extols the primacy of the PHOS ITA:
"The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a
claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim
interpretation." 205 Despite the Federal Circuit's generous mention of the
PHOS IT A, its claim construction precedent reveals very little actual
reference to the PHOS ITA. In fact, the court rarely even tells us who the
PHOS IT A is. And maybe that is because the words defined are not unique to
a particular community or PHOSITA. Does the word "about" mean
something different to an electrical engineer versus a pharmaceutical
manufacturer, at least at the first layer of construction to obtain the
conventional (or ordinary and customary) meaning? Of course, in applying
the definition of "about" to the context of the patent claim in the second layer
of construction, it is likely the various technologies do come into play.
Perhaps the PHOS ITA is not required for the first level of claim
construction, i.e., the determination of the ordinary or conventional word
meaning, but the PHOS ITA is integral to the second level of claim
construction, i.e., putting the term in context. The PHOSITA may also be
required in the first instance when an ordinary term is being used in a nontraditional manner in a particular art, but regardless must always be
addressed in the second level of construction.
There has been much written about the PHOSITA with respect to other
areas of law, particularly the presence (or absence) of the PHOSITA in
obviousness analyses. 206 However, from these articles, we can draw
important considerations about working with the PHOSIT A in claim
construction. One aspect is the variables that come into play when
considering the PHOSIT A: in which particular "art" is he deemed to have
ordinary skill; what level of skill in that art would be considered "ordinary";
and on what date is the snapshot of the PHOSITA's skill taken?207 Further,
Professors Burk and Lemley suggest a number of obstacles that prevent
appropriate application of the PHOS ITA. First, it is difficult for the non205. Phillips Ill, 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1332 (2006).
206. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating
Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 888 (2004) (noting
that the ''PHOSITA sits on the sidelines of obviousness analysis").
207. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 206, at 1188-90.
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scientific district court judge, with limited experience in patent cases, to put
himself into the shoes of an ordinary scientist. 208 Second, it is difficult to
look backwards in time to determine what a scientist knew a number of years
ago without interjecting hindsight bias?09 Finally, they claim that judges
will, based on years of experience with stare decisis, naturally evolve to
applying the determination of a certain level of skill in a particular art again
in subsequent cases. 210
In order to truly return the PHOSIT A to the claim construction table, a
number of changes in current claim construction methodology must be
implemented. The first requirement, but certainly not the easiest, is that fact
deference must be restored, at least partially, to claim construction. As
Professors Burk and Lemley remark in the context of the obviousness
PHOSIT A, "A clear signal by the Federal Circuit that identifying the
PHOSITA is a fact-specific question that must be decided anew in each case
(perhaps by reference to expert testimony) might go a long way towards"
clearing some of the above-referenced obstacles. 211 In particular, district
courts must be encouraged to make factual findings about who exactly this
PHOSIT A is in any given case and what he knows, and the Federal Circuit
must then rely on those findings, unless clearly erroneous. 212 The Federal
Circuit has acknowledged that it cannot construe claims in a vacuum; some
facts must be known in order to construe claims. 213 This is not a complete
reversal of precedent-Markman and its progeny can remain intact. Claim
construction can still remain a question of law for the court to decide;
however, this question of law can be based on factual information, namely
who the PHOSIT A is. The second change will flow from the first-district
court judges must be encouraged to find the PHOSIT A. District court judges
have moved away from determining who the PHOSIT A is, because it seems
to be extraneous work on their part. If the Federal Circuit begins to
208. /d. at 1196-97.
209. /d. at 1198.
210. See id. at 1199.
211. /d. at 1202.
212. Professors Burk and Lemley make these points as well, with respect to the
obviousness PH OS ITA: "[T]he Federal Circuit may need to resist its tendency . . . to
substitute its factual conclusions for those of the district court.... Courts should also spend
more time and effort fleshing out the PHOSITA, who in many opinions seems to be
mentioned only perfunctorily." /d. at 1201-02.
213. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("In this case, despite entry of a final judgment, neither the trial court
nor the parties supplied this court with any information about. the accused products. . . .
Furthermore, this sparse record lacks the complete context for accurate claim construction.").
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acknowledge and utilize the district court's determination, then the district
court judges will be more apt to include the PHOSITA in their claim
construction methodologies.
There are some concerns that have been raised with respect to this
notion, one of which being the idea that finding the PHOSITA at some early
stage of litigation will create a complex layer on top of the Markman stage.
Often times, when the district court has found the PHOSITA, the inquiry is
subsumed with the determination of exactly who is an expert, a question
often raised at about the same point in time. Litigants are already accustomed
to developing this information at an early stage, and thus the determination
of a PHOSITA at the same time, in particular if the PHOSITA were one and
the same with an expert, would not add additional effort or expense to either
the courts or the parties. By inquiring into who the PHOSIT A is and what the
PHOSITA knows, claim interpretation would find more foothold in
linguistics and specifically in pragmatics. Further, in doing so, claim
construction would also effectuate better public notice.
5. Do Not Seek the Applicant's Intent
Given that one of the key functions of patents is to promote public
notice, proper claim construction cannot then rely on the applicant's intent,
as determined by extensive resort to the patent's specification and
prosecution history. However, the applicant's intent factors greatly in the
Federal Circuit's claim construction calculus. Consider, for example,
excerpts from recent decisions of the court, where in one case the Federal
Circuit concluded that inventors "had no intention of claiming
bicarbonates" 214 and in another case investigated "[t]he meaning that the
patentees intended to accord to the claim phrase."215
This quest for the patentee's intent is inapposite in determining the
meaning of a claim term. 216 Moreover, by querying the inventor's intent, the

214. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (emphasis added).
215. Nellcor Puritan Bennett, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 402 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (emphasis added); cf. Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("[W]hile it is of course improper to limit the claims to the particular preferred
embodiments described in the specification, the patentee's choice of preferred embodiments
can shed light on the intended scope ofthe claims." (emphasis added)).
216. George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REv. 321, 328 (1995)
("Meaning is not a matter of a private language or of private intentions in the head of an
author; meaning is necessarily a public and social phenomenon." (citing LUDWIG

2006]

LINGUISTICS AND PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

105

spirit of the PHOSIT A is excised from the calculus. In fact, the practice of
the Federal Circuit to look toward the specification to rein in the ordinary
and customary meaning of claim terms has the indirect effect of seeking
what the inventor intended, rather than honoring the construction of the
PHOSIT A. 217 The very idea of the PHOSIT A is that it is an objective legal
construct, interjected to avoid subjective analysis and to better effectuate the
public notice function of patent law. To consider the inventor's intent would
be to thwart the very objectivity the PHOSIT A provides.
A more appropriate mechanism for claim construction might instead be
akin to textualism. As Professor George Taylor notes: "Textualism examines
two forms of context: internal and external." 218 Internal context focuses on
the "semantic character of a text's structure" and the "movement at work in a
text between such elements as word and sentence, or sentence and text." 219
This internal context is covered by the first three notions described above.
External context, by comparison, analogizes to the idea of interpretation
from the point of view of the PHOSIT A and recognizes that construction
also "depends on background assumptions" and "cannot neglect the cultural,
political, and ideological impingements on the production and interpretation
of meaning." 220 The relationship and applicability of textualism to patent
claim interpretation is a topic unto itself and will not be explored further
here, except to note that consistent claim construction requires that the
interpretation be divorced from any intent of the patentee.
C. Integration with Canons of Claim Interpretation

Many of the canons of claim construction not only can be used in
conjunction with the linguistic-based methodology laid out above, but in
fact, some of them even bolster the validity of the process. For example,
consider the doctrine of claim differentiation. "There is presumed to be a
difference in meaning and scope when different words or phrases are used in
199-202 (Elizabeth Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
1968)).
217. Holbrook, supra note 38, at 142. To be fair, where the inventor has made an
express disavowal or has otherwise provided a clear definition of a word contrary to its
ordinary and customary meaning, the inventor's intent can certainly usurp the ordinary and
customary meaning. However, where there is no such disavowal or contrary definition, to so
limit the claims by importing limitations from the specification can only be described as
interjecting the inventor's perceived intent.
218. Taylor, supra note 216, at 324.
219. !d. at 324-25.
220. /d. at 325.
WriTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
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separate claims." 221 Although this canon was long presumed dead before its
revival as one of the bases for the decision in Phillips, 222 claim
differentiation makes linguistic sense. It is unusual for a speaker to use
different words to refer to the same thing, unless the speaker is trying to
indicate some fundamental difference between certain members of that
thing. 223 For example, a speaker is unlikely to use both the terms "dog" and
"puppy" to mean the same thing; rather, he is likely providing a difference in
scope indicating that a certain class of the "dogs" are of a young age. In
patent usage, if the inventor uses the broad term "dog" in an independent
claim, but later in a dependent claim uses the term "puppy," then the
inference is that the use of "dog" in the independent claim is broader.
Because this canon relies heavily on the ordinary and customary meanings of
words, it fits naturally within the claim construction methodology proposed
in this Article. In the same vein, the canon that states that a term that is used
repeatedly should be given the same definition throughour 24 is also
linguistically sound and should fit easily within this scheme.
Other claim construction canons also have some linguistic relevance. For
example, the canon that instructs adopting the narrow interpretation when
both a broad and a narrow interpretation exist225 has solid footing in this
system. Although the Federal Circuit encouraged use of this canon as a
penalty to the patentee for his ambiguity in claim drafting, another valid
reason for adopting this canon is the notion that the ordinary and customary
meaning of a word must have some overlapping universal boundaries to be
generally understood. While each reader may hear the word "rose" and
derive a slightly different ordinary and customary meaning, within those
boundaries there must be a sliver of overlapping meaning such that we all
221. Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Cornrn'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
222. Compare Phillips lll, 415 F.3d 1303, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (Lourie, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The court premises its reverse-and-remand
decision on the concept of claim differentiation ...."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006),
with Kraft Foods, Inc. v. lnt'l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting
doctrine of claim differentiation in light of insight provided by written description), and 0.1.
Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1582-84 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (same).
223. Even the great urban legend that Eskimos had an inordinate number of words for
"snow" was debunked because the various terms each had a different scope, not unlike the
English usage of "blizzard" and "flurry," which both mean snow but reference different
qualities. See GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE GREAT EsKIMO VOCABULARY HOAX AND OTHER
IRREVERENT EsSAYS ON THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 159-74 (1991); Wikipedia, Eskimo Words
for Snow, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eskimo_words_for_snow (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
224. See CVI!Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
225. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
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understand what is meant. If you consider the ordinary and customary
meanings of a certain term given by a number of people in the mode of a
Venn diagram, there will be some area where all of the meanings overlap.
This narrow claim construction is a better choice for the ordinary and
customary meaning than is a broad one, because it is most representative of
the ordinary and customary meaning for the largest group of people. 226
The canon that provides for instances when the claim preamble is a
lirnitation227 also has some footing in linguistic analysis. The preamble acts
as a limitation where a claim term derives significance or meaning from the
preamble, as well as where the preamble is essential to particularly pointing
out the invention. In these cases, the preamble becomes part of the critical
syntax of the claim, a portion of the claim sentence that helps direct meaning
for the terms in dispute. Arguably, in giving a linguistic eye toward the claim
construction process, the preamble would always be relevant when
considering the syntax of the claim; however, in many claims, the preamble
is no more than a generic sentence starter that adds little meaning or context
to the claim. 228
IV. CONCLUSION

Because these linguistic notions are more attuned to the process by
which we, as speakers of English, naturally strive to define the words that we
read and hear, these techniques are more likely to produce consistent claim
construction results, yielding greater certainty and effectuating the public
226. The concern has been raised by practicing attorneys that this is unrealistic
because zealous lawyers will make arguments that potentially fall outside of the overlapping
portion of the Venn diagram. I disagree; there must still be some commonality in order for the
proposed definition to be appropriate and for the lawyer to maintain some credibility with the
court. For example, in defining "rose" one attorney may argue that it is a pink flower with
thorns, and another attorney may argue that it is a red flower with a powerful fragrance. The
Venn diagram commonality, at the least, can include certain flowers in the pink-red family, a
reasonable, ordinary and customary definition. The attorney that comes in and argues that
"rose" is a blue-haired camel falls outside of this commonality and loses credibility with the
court (and likely the case for his client).
227. See Bell Commc'ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
228. For example, a preamble may be as simple and non-descriptive as "a method,"
"an article," or "a system." See, e.g., Processing Internet Protocol Security Traffic, U.S. Patent
No. 6,996,842 (filed Jan. 30, 2001) (issued Feb. 7, 2006). On the other hand, the preamble
may include more description. See, e.g., Language Translation System and Method Using
Specialized Dictionaries, U.S. Patent No. 6,996,520 (filed Nov. 14, 2003) (issued Feb. 7,
2006) ("A system for translating text from a source language to a target language ....").
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notice and boundary staking functions of patent claims. The Federal Circuit,
rather than taking advantage of the en bane opportunity explicitly chosen to
provide clarity and consistency in claim construction that is necessary to
allow patents to achieve their public notice function, passed on the
opportunity and reverted to the anything-but-clear status quo. This status
quo, besides failing to address public notice, also neglects some basic
intuitions about understanding the language that we all have. Because we all
have these intuitions, it would be expected that anyone approaching claim
construction from this angle will have a reasonable chance of reaching the
same conclusion, thereby improving consistency and in the end, public
notice.

